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During the past twenty-five years Japan has evolved
from a war-ravaged country subsidized by the United States
to a major industrial nation advancing at twice the speed of
any other industrial country. Japan has grown economically
to take a current position as the world's third largest
industrial producer behind the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Paul Samuelson, the distinguished American economist,
envisions the possibility of a 160 percent growth in Japan's
Gross National Product between 1970 and 1980. Herman Kahn
,
a widely respected expert on Japan, predicts that that
nation will continue building from its present base of power
and that by the year 2000, it will surpass the United States
in per capita G.N. P. to become the richest nation in the
2
world. The continuous real economic growth has averaged
Paul A. Samuelson, "Japan Revisited," Newsweek
,
November 15, 1971, p. 101.
2Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate:
Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 130.

ten percent (since 1954) and is without parallel in the
modern world. (See Table 1 and Chart 1.) Implications of
this make Japan an important customer, supplier, and
formidable competitor of the United States.
It is felt that a survey of Japanese management's
concepts and practices which can be contrasted with those
of the United States would be timely and hopefully useful.
The success of that nation's managers in developing their
economy will have a far-reaching impact on executives around
the world. The growing interaction between these two
societies requires a greater appreciation for the unique
aspects of the two individually, and as they affect one
another. The object of this study is to survey comparative
management concepts and practices which have materially
contributed to the economic success of both nations. It is
hoped that a better understanding of the similarities and
differences in managerial practices will prove of value to
managers and students of management as the cultures of the
United States and Japan come into greater contact in the
future.
Scope
The scope of research for this thesis has been
constrained due to the author's inability to read either
Japanese ideographic script (Kanji) or the two current
syllabaries (Katakana and Hiragana) . Therefore, source data

TABLE 1
GROWTH RATE OF GNP (Real %)
1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1968
Japan 8.9 10.0 12.
4
1
Canada 3.4 5.5 4.8
France 5.3 5.8 4.8
W. Germany 7.6 5.0 3.1
Italy 5.6 5.3 6.0
U.K. 2.7 3.4 2.3
U.S.A. 2.2 4.8 4.7
U.S.S.R. 2 9.1 6.6 7.9
1„.Figure for 1965-1969.
'Net material product.
Source: OECD and United Nations.
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5has been necessarily reduced to those publications in English
and French and to translations of Japanese works by other
persons. By this restriction, much valuable information may
have been omitted. However, a rather extensive bibliography
has been developed with emphasis given to literature
published since 1965.
Personal interviews with foreign service officers at
the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
and the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. provided
considerable insight into the Japanese philosophy, culture
and values. Additional perceptions of Japanese management
practices and contemporary changes in attitudes of recent
graduates of educational institutions regarding lifetime
employment and remuneration tied to seniority were cited by
Katsuhiro Fujiwara, the chief economist of the United
States-Japan Trade Council.
Organization
The study has been organized in a fashion to permit
a comparative analytical approach to the evolution of
managerial concepts and practices in the United States and
Japan. An attempt has been made to maintain historical
perspective throughout all the chapters.
In the writing of this study, the Japanese practice
of giving the family name first has been observed where the
names appear in the text. References to authors in the

6footnotes and in the bibliography are in the standard
Western manner with family name last. In addition, because
so many Japanese terms have been used, a glossary of these
has been added as Appendix I to facilitate identification.
As a basis for understanding the Japanese concepts
and practices of management, and to provide a conceptual
framework from which to expand, Chapter II examines the Post
World War II economy of Japan. The effects of U.S.
occupation and legislation aimed at dissolving the Zaibatsu
are covered along with the reasons for the unparalleled
economic growth.
Chapter III describes the Japanese management
concepts and practices which are in some cases unique to
that country.
An analytical comparison is made in Chapter IV of
behavioral, functional and institutional dimensions which
interface with the practices of management in Japan and the
United States.
The national spirit and concern for productivity
has imbued the labor, management, and government with a
collective relationship which has been dubed "Japan, Inc."
Japanese management since World War II has played a
significant role in the genesis of "Japan, Inc." Based
upon the facts presented, Chapter V draws a conclusion
as to the effects that Japanese managerial practices have
had on the development of their viable and modern economy.

The durability of these practices is examined in light of the
dynamic forces which have been thrust upon the country as a
result of sustained growth. A determination is made
regarding the universality of management principles and
their effect on the managerial practices in the United States
and Japan.
The writer has a Western point of view which serves





BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR ECONOMY
Background
When General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) , returned to Japan on
August 30, 19 45, to begin seven years of allied occupation,
he found a nation whose economy was completely shattered
and whose major cities had been devastated by bombing.
Twenty-two million Japanese, or 30 percent of the civilian
population, were homeless. What remained of Japan's
2
manufacturing capability was outmoded or worn down.
Economic Policies of the Occupation
The allies chose to further reduce Japan's war-
making potential by exacting reparations. The United States
post-surrender policy for Japan was promulgated in such a
manner that the SCAP was able to exercise little latitude
Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and
Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1949)
, pp. 406-408.
2 SCAP , Summation of Non-Military Activities in
Japan and Korea for September-October 19 45 , No. 1 (Tokyo:
SCAP-GHQ, January 1946), pp. 48-54.

in initial occupation policy which was designed to
. . . insure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the United States or to the peace and
security of the world .... The existing economic
basis of Japanese military strength must be
destroyed and not be permitted to revive .... To
this end, it shall be the policy of the Supreme
Commander ... to favor a program for the dissolu-
tion of the large industrial and banking combinations
which have exercised control of a great part of
Japanese trade and industry.
The policies of Japan have brought down upon the
people great economic destruction and confronted
them with the prospect of economic difficulty and
suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct out-
come of its own behavior, and the Allies will not
undertake the burden of repairing the damage.
1
The prospects of economic recovery were further
diminished on November 1, 1945, when the Joint Chiefs of
Staff gave direction to SCAP as follows:
You will not assume any responsibility for the
economic rehabilitation of Japan on the strengthen-
ing of the Japanese economy. You will make it
clear to the Japanese people that you assume no
obligation to maintain any particular standard of
living in Japan.
2
As a result of the initial hard-line policy,
Japanese leaders, both governmental and industrial, were
confronted with an almost insurmountable task of rebuilding
the economy. The initial recovery was slow. Although later
U.S. Department of State, War and Navy, United
States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan , as published
in the U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Japan
, pp.
78-79.






abandoned, 1930-1934 was selected as a base period for
determining Japanese peacetime requirements. By 1947
production amounted to only 40 percent of the established
. 1base.
President Truman appointed Edwin W. Pauley as his
representative on reparations. Pauley headed a commission
which dealt Japanese industry a severe blow. On March 1,
19 46, the Pauley report, among other things, urged that:
The Allied Powers should take no action to
assist Japan in maintaining a standard of living
higher than that of neighboring Asiatic countries
injured by Japanese aggression .... Under this
principle, a broad view should be taken of the
economy, and especially of the varying degree of
industrialization of Eastern Asia as a whole. The
overall aim should be to raise and to even up the
level of industrialization. This aim cannot be
served by considered allocation, to different
countries, of industrial equipment exacted from
Japan as reparations. Reconstruction is an
urgent need of all countries against which Japan
committed aggression. Reconstruction is also
needed in Japan. In the overall comparison of
needs Japan should have the last priority.
The zaibatsu . . . are the greatest war
potential of Japan. It is they who made possible
all Japan's conquests and aggressions ....
Unless the zaibatsu are broken up, the Japanese
have little prospect of being able to govern
themselves as free men. As long as_the zaibatsu
survive, Japan will be their Japan.
U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Area Hand-
book for Japan , 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1964), p. 659.
2Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations to
the President of the United States (U.S. Department of State
Publication 3174, Far Eastern Series 25, Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 6-7, 39-40.
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Dissolution of the Zaibatsu
A major policy decision which reshaped the Japanese
economy involved the steps which were taken to deconcentrate
Japanese industry and emasculate the Zaibatsus
. This effort
of debilitating the huge politically and economically
powerful combines took three forms: first, the ownership
base of industry was broadened by severing current owner-
ship ties through confiscation of stock, dissolution, and/or
reorganization of specific companies; second, the severing
of personal ties; and third, the passage of major legisla-
tion with regard to monopoly and deconcentration.
In order to remove the threat of future military
expansionist type influence, the following specific actions
were taken: First, the four principal Zaibatsu (Mitsui
,
Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Mitsubishi) were directed to transfer
"all securities owned by them and all other evidences of
ownership or control of any interest in any firm, corpora-
2tion or other enterprise" to a Holding Company Liquidation
Commission. Second, the leaders of Japanese industry were
cited for their part in World War II and became the target
of a SCAP personnel purge. As stated in JCS Directive
1380/15 of November 1, 19 45, the object was
Thomas A. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan







To eliminate all persons who have been active
exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.
In the absence of evidence ... to the contrary,
you will assume that any persons who have held key
positions of high responsibility since 1937 in
industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture have
been active, exponents of militant nationalism and
aggression.
There is considerable disparity between source data
figures as to the number of top executives actually purged.
2 3Combined source data varies between 4,764 to 4,020
persons (directors, staff members with executive responsi-
bility, auditors, etc.) who were required to cease work
within their particular combine for ten years. Thirdly, two
types of legislation were enacted which were designed to
eliminate the monopolization of industry by the Zaibatsu .
First, an antimonopoly law, the "Law Relating to [the]
Prohibition of Private Monopolies and the Maintenance of
Fair Trade," became law on April 14, 1947. This law was
based upon a draft proposal submitted to the Japanese
government by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice
Department and served to prohibit private monopolies from
engaging in unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair





2Eleanor M. Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princeton,
N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 92-102.





to the Clayton (Antitrust) Act. Second, a deconcentration
law, called the "Law for the Elimination of Excessive
Concentration of Economic Powers" was promulgated on
December 18, 19 47. The function of this act was to eliminate
excessive concentration of economic power in an enterprise
"which by reason of its relative size in any line or in the
cumulative power of its position is many lines, restricts
competition or impairs the opportunity for others to engage
2in business independently."
Effect of Legislation on Economy
These acts of liberalization had a far-reaching
impact on the economy. Although the purge laws were in
3
effect for only four years, they have affected the practice
of management in several ways: (1) Management personnel
selected to fill vacancies caused by the purge were chosen
from the upper-middle layer of management on the basis of
skill and managerial ability. Despite the depurge of 1951,
relatively few of the executives ousted returned to their
old positions. Some reasons for this are expressed below:
First, after the war many corporations became
independent and their top management consisted now
of new and younger executives--there was little
Kozo Yamamura, Economic Policy in Postwar Japan
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 10.
2Quotation from Deconcentration Law as presented in
Appendix 5 of Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
, pp. 262-
268.
Hadley, Antitrust in Japan, p. 390.
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room left for the return of corporate leaders
(although the majority . . . did not express a
desire to come back); second, a series of sweeping
changes in the corporate environment after the war
made the knowhow of former executives critically-
obsolete (e.g., they were totally inexperienced in
dealing with labor unions ).l
Top level executives of the postwar era were younger.
"In the 1951-52 period, the president or chairman of the
board was of an average age of 51.8 years; at war's end,
260.2 years." Forced dissolution of the holding companies
and/or" liquidation of the stock of holding companies which
were not dissolved had the effect of decentralizing the
corporate power structure. Under these laws, stock owner-
ship no longer is a prerequisite to positions of management
and the number of persons owning stock had increased
dramatically. In general, it can be stated that the net
effect of these laws "resulted in a decline in the role of
government (with regard to stock) , and it unintentionally
produced a great increase in the role of financial
4institutions. Today, Japanese concerns have a capital
structure which is on the average comprised of 75 percent
debt capital and 25 percent equity capital. One authority
Ryutaro Komiya , ed. , Postwar Economic Growth in
Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp.
234-235.










places the debt-equity ratio at 80-20. This approach to
capital financing was brought about by Japanese tax laws
which allow corporations to deduct interest on bank borrowed
capital as an expense, whereas the money paid as stock
dividends is taxable, although, in fact, it is also an
expense to the company. As a result, banks serve as the
keystone to present day conglomerates which typically have
2
working control of 20 to 30 major companies.
The government encourages this type of operation by
supplying funds through the central bank, the Bank of
3Japan. The economy has benefited from this system which
gives ultimate control to the banks by virtue of the
objective capital allocation process in which the banks
allocate private capital and the government "advises" the
banks on major capital programs which effect foreign
trade.
Reorientation of American Policy
The evolution of the "Cold War" which became a
reality by 1948 contributed in a large measure to a dramatic
change in policy which contributed to the recovery of the
Robert J. Ballon, "Understanding the Japanese,"
Business Horizons
,
Indiana University Graduate School of
Business, Vol. XIII, No. 3, June 1970, p. 23.
2John C. Lobb, "'Japan, Inc. 1 —The Total
Conglomerate," Columbia Journal of World Business , Vol. VI,










The Draper-Johnson Mission was sent to Japan and
Korea to investigate the broad economic problems of inflation
and industrial stagnation. On April 26, 1948, this
committee (known as the "Johnson Committee") recommended
that steps be taken to curtail war reparations and to
increase foreign aid in the form of dollars so that Japan
could have "the initial imported materials required to
augment production quickly."
Subsequently, the SCAP reduced pressure on the
Japanese government with regard to economic reforms and
placed a new emphasis on rehabilitation of industry. In
1948, the Japanese government was authorized to use the
proceeds from the disposition of items imported under the
U.S. aid program to repair and modernize her industry.
Food, fertilizer, and industrial raw materials grants
2increased from $194,000 in 1946 to $534,000 in 1949.
Another factor which contributed to the recovery
of the economy was the implementation of the Nine
3Principles for the Stabilization of the Economy. These
"Report on the Economic Position and Prospects of
Japan and Korea and the Measures Required to Improve Them,"
Extracted from Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan
,
p. 143.
2Hadley, Antitrust in Japan
, pp. 133 and 144.
3
"Japan's Postwar Economy," Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Tokyo, 1970, p. 1.
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principles, which were known as the Dodge Line, were
introduced by SCAP to curb inflation and thereby pave the way
for Japan's reemergence as a major world trading nation.
Through the mechanisms of balancing the national budget,
retirement of debt, discontinuance of government lending,
and reduction of subsidies, these actions proved effective
and postwar inflation was rapidly brought under control.
In April of 1949, the single exchange rate was
established which pegged the yen to the U.S. dollar at a
ratio of 360 to 1.
In June of 1950, the Korean War broke out and the
economy moved into a period of boom. Japan enjoyed a
windfall of about $2.2 billion from 1951 to 1953 in a form
2
of special procurements by the United Nations Forces.
These funds provided the income necessary to procure
capital equipment which helped narrow the gap in technology
between Japan and the West. Table 2 shows the magnitude of
industrial production changes between 19 34 and 1952, the
year occupation ended and aid from the U.S. ceased.
Post Korean War Economic Recovery
When the Peace Treaty with Japan came into force in
1952, the country had begun a period of sustained economic
growth. When the Korean War ended in the summer of 1953,
Named after Joseph Dodge, Economic Advisor to SCAP,
2
"Japan's Postwar Economy," Ministry of Foreign






















































































































































































war associated procurements ended but this source of money
was offset by foreign capital investments.
In September of 1953, the Japanese Diet passed an
amendment to the antimonopoly law which reversed its stance
against large corporations and provided for legalized
cartels, relaxed stock holding regulations, redefined unfair
business competition, and eliminated articles 5 and 8
which prohibited monopolistic organizations and substantial
. . 2disparity in bargaining powers.
By 1955 Japan reached its prewar economic level and
then began a sustained rate of economic growth which has
been unparalleled in the history of the modern world. (See
Chart 2.) By 1971 its gross national product exceeded 200
3billion and is third in the world.
Major Factors Sustaining High Growth Performance
There are many reasons which can be cited to explain
Japan's past and projected economic growth. Herman Kahn has





2Yamamura, Economic Policy in Postwar Japan , pp,
56-57.
3
"Japan: Adjusting to the Nixon Shokko," Time ,
October 4, 1971, p. 34.
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1. A great deal of available energy and
dedication and the general Japanese capacity for
purposive, communal action.
2. Stringent population limitation.
3. Appropriate and available organizational
skills, judgment and motivation—both governmental
and private.
4. Relatively high technological and educa-
tional levels.
5. High savings and investment rate.
6. Japanese version of free enterprise.
7. Skillful governmental direction and inter-
vention (and a reasonably cooperative and sensible
policy on the part of the United States)
.
8. All kinds of pressures to attain "higher
market shores" and to go into advanced technology
and industries of the future.
9. Ruthless refusal to support—or even
actively "sabotage"— "obsolete" or "not for
Japanese" business; equally ruthless support and
protection of modern growth industries and
advantageous export industries.
10. Willingness to switch to "economic growth
as a major tactic in catching up with the West."
11. Desirable and inexpensive work force
readily available.
12. High savings and investment rates (about
twice those of the U.S.).
13. Superior education and training (American
quantity and European quality through high schools),
14. "Adequate Capitalization."
15. Readily available "risk capital."
16. Technological capabilities competitive with
those of the West.





employees (probably increasingly so)
.
18. High morale and commitment to economic
growth and to surpassing the West
—
by government,
by management, by labor, and by the general public .
19. Willingness to make necessary adjustment
and/or sacrifices.
20. Excellent management of the economy—by
government, by business, and to some degree, by
labor; this results in a controlled and to some
degree collectivist ("Japan, Inc.") economy, but
still competitive and market-oriented (but not
market-dominated) capitalism.
21. Adequate access—on good and perhaps
improving terms— to most world resources and
markets.
22. Almost all future technological and economic,
and most cultural and political, developments
favorable to continuation of the above.
23. Relatively few and/or weak pressures to
divert major resources to "low economic
productivity" uses. [Emphasis supplied.]
These factors conform to the three basic elements
which various authorities generally agree serve to explain
in a large measure Japan's phenomenal economic growth since
the end of the occupation.
Capitalistic Orientation
First, the high response of the Japanese people to a
market-oriented, capitalistic economy, which Kahn places
first and foremost, stating
. . . the general capacity for purposive communal
action which, when it was finally reactivated and
focused on the problem of recovery performed with

23
its usual skill and dynamism.
The national goal of reducing birth rates was supported by
management, trade unions, and government and is cited as an
2
example of social and communal solidarity. In this
endeavor the birth rate has been reduced from 34 per 1000 in
31947 to the present level of 20 per 1000.
Government Initiative
The second element is the active role of the govern-
ment in developing economic plans which exert a large
4influence upon the behavior of private business. To this
end low interest rates have been established to encourage
businesses to invest in modern technology and high
productive machinery. The people utilize the facilities of
more than 20,000 post offices to save a significant portion
of their earnings (the Japanese propensity for saving is
more than twice that of other major industrial countries,
5
viz , 20 percent versus 6-13 percent) . Government taxation
Ibid.
, p. 77.
2Toshinobo Kato, "Family Planning in Industry: The
Japanese Experience," International Labor Review , Vol. 104,
No. 3, September 1971, pp. 161-179.










measures provide for special depreciation allowances in
addition to those considered normal in the West. The
effective tax rate for corporate business is approximately
40 percent which is one of the lowest among major countries
in the world.
As a result of government influence and individual
thrift, the country has a high capital reinvestment rate of
39 percent of GNP in contract to 18 percent for the United
States. In addition, the individual savings rate as a
percent of personal income is 20 percent, almost three
2times that of the American worker.
The ability of the Japanese to assimilate and
efficiently utilize massive amounts of Western technology
and managerial expertise is the third major elements which
accounts for that nation's growth. This appreciation of
technology is not new. Hitler termed the Japanese "honorary
Aryans" and considered them "Europeans in disguise" due to
3their propensity for modern technology. Japanese manage-
ment has procured large numbers of patents outright through
licensing arrangements and foreign technical agreements.





Peter G. Peterson, The United States in the
Changing World Economy (Washington, D.C. : Government
Printing Office, 1971), p. 58.
3Peter Drucker, Technology, Management and Society
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 75.
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rather than to develop the technology internally. During the
past ten years, that nation has paid out $3.4 billion for
access to foreign technology. Japanese royalty and manage-
ment payments increased to $650 million in 1970, and more
than half of that was paid to the United States. In 19 71
the Japanese productivity growth rate had climbed to 10.6
percent due primarily to new technology. By contrast, the
U.S. rate of productivity growth had decreased from its
o
postwar average of 2.6 percent to just 1.7 percent.
As a complement to the inflow of technology, the
Japanese have developed an educational system which
3graduates more engineers than the U.S. and which has pro-
4duced the most literate population in the world. By 1980
the government of Japan expects to spend $13 billion on
incentives and subsidies for research and development.
The Japanese government has adopted a policy of
fostering research and development through various forms of
assistance such as partial exemption from income tax, special
depreciation and import controls. Thus, research and




"Making U.S. Technology More Competitive," Business





Lobb, "'Japan, Inc.' —The Total Conglomerate," p. 42,
Ken Bieda, The Structure and Operation of the
Japanese Economy (Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 50.
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development has contributed in a large measure to that
nation's preeminence in such industries as shipbuilding,
computers, steel, commercial motor vehicles, cameras, and
televisions.
Worker Motivation
Although hard to quantify, an important factor of
Japan's economic strength and growth is the vigor and work
spirit displayed by Japan's efficient and flexible work
force. These intangible qualities are, in a large measure,
attributable to worker motivation and an organizational
approach by both labor and management which stimulates
2
economic growth. Western visitors to factories and plants
in Japan are generally impressed by the workers' "willingness
3
to work," "discipline," "finishing up the work," etc.
These motivational factors occur in a work setting (Sony's
Atsugai, Japan Plant) which is traditionally considered most
suited to incentive type wages. However, workers prefer the
seniority pay system and refute the idea of remuneration
based upon productivity. A typical response to a question
concerning the fairness of the present system is "It's
better that way, because everybody is working hard,
Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate , p. 209.
2










This approach to wages recognizes the fact that
inadequate wages can only bring dissatisfaction and the real
reward, satisfaction
, to Japanese workers comes from the fact
that he believes he has contributed to the group and company
by "doing his best." This is in keeping with the research
2conducted by Dr. Herzberg concerning worker motivation.
Japanese managers recognize the importance of
employee motivation and strive to enhance the workers self-
respect by taking measures which enable the workers at all
levels to assume responsibility. One large firm (Sony) has
done this by abolishing controls over leave periods, remov-
ing time clocks and using the honor system in the employees'
cafeteria.
A significant postwar achievement of Japanese manage-
ment has been the adoption of a nationwide concern for
quality and craftsmanship in manufactured products. Manage-
ment has developed a widespread concept by which quality
control is the responsibility of the total organization with
the onus for quality resting with the production workers
4
rather than quality assurance specialists. Mr. Nishibori,
Shigeru Kobayashi , Creative Management (New York:
American Management Association, 1971), p. 220.
2Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man
(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1966), p. 134.
3Kobayashi, Creative Management
, p. 235.
Sidney P. Rubenstein, "New Management Concepts from
Japan," Paperboard Packaging , January, 1970, p. 44.

28
a pioneer of the postwar quality control movement in Japan,
explains the position of Japanese management regarding
quality control:
Manufacturing an article, whether it is made
with a machine or by hand, is to incorporate
quality into it, from the original viewpoint of
quality control. It is workers, not the foreman
or team head, who are making things. It is quite
natural that the workers should check the quality
incorporated by his own effort into the product
.
The Japanese approach to quality control goes hand-
in-glove with the Herzberg approach to "job enrichment" and
affords all employees, regardless of position in the
organization, the opportunity to participate by way of some
meaningful contribution which increases the employee's
2psychological growth.
Environmental Factors
There are numerous international, political, and
economic conditions which have complemented the national-
istic reasons previously listed which help explain this
3
rapid rate of economic growth. These include:
1. A small portion of GNP allocated to defense
(less than 1 percent)
.
2. Stimulus of the Korean and Viet Nam Wars.
1 Ibid .
2
Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You
Motivate Employees?," Harvard Business Review , Vol. 46, No.
1, January-February, 196 8, p. 58.
Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate , p. 20 8.
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3. Influx of American capital.
4. U.S. a prosperous and avid customer (see Chart 3).
5. Technology available at bargain rates from the
U.S. and Europe.
6. General atmosphere of free trade.
7. Large discovery in Australia and elsewhere of
new mineral deposits.
8. Developments in ocean transport.
From this short review of the Post World War II
political and economic scene, it is apparent that Japan has
neither subscribed to nor adopted the "Invisible Hand"
principle espoused by Adam Smith whereby any interference
with free enterprise by government was almost certain to be
injurious. The Japanese government is involved in many
aspects of economic decision making. For example, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in conjunction
with the Bank of Japan, plans the business strategy of
2Japanese industry in world markets. Table 3 shows that 11
percent of Japan's GNP is destined for foreign consumption.
3Of this amount, 30 percent is imported by the U.S. The
planning process is not centralized to the extent found in
Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. In
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory
Analysis (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co, 1967), p. 41
p. 41.
Economy , Chart 34
2Lobb, "'Japan, Inc.'—The Total Conglomerate,"
3Peterson, The United States in the Changing World
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of goods of goods
and and
services services
Japan 51.0 8.2 35.2 11.0 9.3
Canada 60.9 15.3 23.3 24.3 23.1
France 60.4 12.3 25.4 14.5 15.2
W. Germany- 55.4 15.6 24.3 22.5 19.9
Italy 63.4 13.4 20.5 18.9 17.3
U.K. 62.3 17.9 17.3 21.1 20.7
U.S.A. 61.2 20.9 16.7 5.0 5.3
U.S.S.R. 2 63.5 8.1 15.2 _ _
Figures for 1968.
2Net material product: col. 1, individual consumption;





contrast, the plans of the Japan Economic Planning Agency are
prepared in consultation with experts from industry. While
these plans lack legal sanction, they do play a major role in
the operation of private business.
Since the end of World War II, a close working
relationship between management, labor, and government has
evolved within which the marshaling of that nation's man-
power, technology, and capital to stimulate economic growth
has been successfully achieved. This system, dubbed by
2
some authorities as "Japan, Inc." has associated with it
unique managerial concepts and practices which have been
examined for possible application in other cultural settings.




Lobb, "'Japan, Inc. 1 —The Total Conglomerate," p. 39

CHAPTER III
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES
Introduction
Many observers are impressed by recent advances of
Japan's industrial system. It should be pointed out that
these advances rest upon a foundation of economic development
which has paralleled that of the West for much of the last
century. However, the industrial system is deeply rooted in
a bedrock of cultural heritage.
Japanese management practices are influenced by that
nation's homogenous background and culture which include a
deep respect for authority, hard work and group cohesiveness.
These sociocultural factors foster a spirit of cooperation
between management, labor, and government. After hundreds
of years of evolution, this industrialized nation retains
from her Confucian past a vertically structured pattern of
social ideology.
Tadayoski Yamada , a management consultant for the
Yawata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., in reflecting on the origin





Traditionally, human relations in Japan have
been governed by a patriarchal system which binds
parent to child by parental self-sacrifice and
filial piety master to dependent by life-long ties
of responsibility for the welfare of the dependent
and fealty devotion to the master and which
fosters respect for seniority of any kind--
including age, social status, experience and
conservative ideas.
1
The influence of paternalism has permeated all levels
of Japan's corporate structure. One inquiry into the views
of Japanese managers revealed that almost 75 percent of the
top managers considered their employees as their collaborators,
20 percent considered employee welfare as part of the firm's
responsibility, and only three percent regarded employees
2
as suppliers of labor on a contractual basis. This
ideology of management helps explain the following business
management practices which are unique to Japan.
Employment Patterns
When an individual becomes employed he enters into
a type of informal contract. His association is normally
permanent and he is expected to remain with the company,
government agency or university until retirement age (55)
,
3
and his salary is based on age and tenure of service.
Tadayoski Yamada, "Japanese Management Practices,"
The Conference Board Record , November 19 69, p. 22.
2Yoshitaka Uchiki , et al. , "Ideology and Action of
Japanese Top-Management," Monthly Report of the Japan
Economic Research Centre , September 1965, pp. 90-91.
3
Massaki Imai, "Shukko, Jomukai, Ringi—The
Ingredients of Executive Selection in Japan," Personnel ,
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This practice did not evolve until the depression
following World War I which forced Japanese businessmen to
modernize their organizations and upgrade the quality of
employees. Companies hired young workers who had just left
school and gave them training. As a result of these training
programs employees developed a loyalty to their companies.
A form of psychological contract between employee and
employer began to be formulated, based upon the traditional
doctrine of loyalty and hard work in exchange for job
security. The destruction of Japanese industry during World
War II brought about a chaotic situation which meant that
discharging an employee was tantamount to a curse of
perpetual unemployment. Labor unions focused on protecting
employment to such an extent that a norm evolved through
which companies were forced to give up the right to dismiss
their permanent employees.
This "lifetime" employment concept interfaces well
with a national characteristic called amaeru which is defined
2
as a "longing to be looked after and protected." This
trait leads young workers to develop a feeling of dependency
on their employers, and they associate their fate with that
Vol. 46, No. 4, July-August, 1969, p. 20.
Akio Morita, "Tradition Adapts to a Competitive
Labor Market," Columbia Journal of World Business , Vol. Ill,
No. 4, July-August, 1968, pp. 51-52.
2Howard F. Van Zandt, "How to Negotiate in Japan,"
Harvard Business Review, November- December 1970, p. 47.
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of their employer, who acts in loco parentis . This close
worker identification with the firm is illustrated in Table
4. The Japanese rate their company's success higher in
2importance than do workers in other nations. Workers have
a strong feeling of common interest with their employers
and tend to be satisfied with wage increases below the level
that would be detrimental to their firm's competitive
capacity. This helps explain why the rate of productivity
growth in organized industries has generally exceeded that
3
of union wages. The seniority system of pay has provided
for a doubling of a worker's wages about every 15 years,
4
regardless of the type of job. Frequently, wages and
salaries are different for the same job depending on the
employee's age. Each year a pay raise is made to workers
5based upon longevity. Workers exhibit an almost fanatical
James G. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory (Glencoe,
111.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 73.
2David Sirota and J. Michael Greenwood, "Understand
Your Overseas Work Force," Harvard Business Review , January-
February 1971, p. 59.
Taishiro Shirai, "Prices and Wages in Japan:
Towards an Anti- Inflationary Policy," International Labor
Review , Vol. 103, No. 3, March 1971, p. 238.
4Peter F. Drucker , "What We Can Learn From Japanese
Management," Harvard Business Review , March-April 1971,
p. 113.









I think of my company as
:
1. the central concern in my
life and of greater importance
than my personal life; 1 9
2. a part of my life at least
equal in importance to my
personal life; 23 57
3. a place for me to work with
management, during working
hours, to accomplish mutual
goals; 54 26
4. strictly a place to work,
and entirely separate from
my personal life. 23 6
Source ; Whitehill and Takezawa, "Cultural Values and
Employee Attitudes," Journal of Applied Psychology
,
Vol. 48, No. 1 (1964), pp. 69-72.
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devotion to their employer, i.e., at one of Japan's largest
companies, Matsushita Electric, every day begins with the
singing of the company hymn which espouses greater glory
to the firm and nation rather than individual advancement.
It has been observed that the ubiquitous emphasis on
productivity and work harmony contribute to heavy
psychological pressures on some Japanese workers. Cultural
norms require the average employee to cultivate complex and
formally polite relationships within the firm. In one large
corporation 23.6 percent of employee absenteeism was
2
attributed to stomach ailments. The psychologists of
Matsushita have linked stomach disorders to nervous tension,
possibly occurring at the work place. To combat this the
firm has constructed an elaborate "self-control room"
complete with life-sized padded dummies, surrogate employers
or fellow employees, which an employee can batter and punch
in order to harmlessly work off his frustrations and tension.
Management considers the use of the "self-control room" to be
an effective form of therapy which pays off in the form of
3higher morale and efficiency.
It is significant to note that Matsushita has
recently begun to rationalize its employment practices and
1971, p. 40
3
Lobb, "'Japan, Inc.'—The Total Conglomerate."
2






has devised a system that bases wages and promotion on
ability and experience. It is estimated that the transition
to productivity and merit, if successful, will take ten
years.
The intense loyalty engendered within the paterna-
listic employment structure in which management gives
workers advice, counsel, and liberal fringe benefits, is
further illustrated by Kazue Kitagawa in an October 31,
1969, address to the Third International Convention on Work
Factor, Tokyo, entitled: "A View of Modern Management in
Japan.
"
In the event that the very existence of a company
becomes threatened, the employees, as a body, will
strive with their utmost efforts to reconstruct
the company, even if that should require a
reduction in the salaries of all members, rather
than move as individuals to other companies.
The term "lifetime employment" as it applies to the
Japanese labor market does not mean that all workers have a
permanent job for life. Most employees do have a guaranteed
job once they are on the payroll which affords them complete
job security. There are no temporary lay-offs due to lack of
work and only in the event of the most severe economic
crisis, i.e., bankruptcy of the employer, will the worker
2lose his job. The "lifetime employment" picture is
"Japanese Head for a Bout With Inflation," Business
Week , December 6, 19 69, p. 68.





(1) Women are almost always placed in a
"temporary" worker status; and as such are
exempted from the benefits of tenure.
(2) The "traditional" Japanese businesses
which are labor intensive in nature such as
workshop industries producing lacquer, silk
and pottery have per hour wages and are not
considered permanent in nature.
(3) Approximately 2 0. percent of the workers
in modern industries are considered "temporary"
for many years.
1
Another source reveals that Japanese managers utilize sub-
contractors extensively as an adjustment value in period of
employment variance. (See Table 5.)
A recent survey places 50 percent of the non-
agricultural labor force in the category of a "permanent
2
worker." The official retirement age is 55 for all
employees (one report indicates that the age is being
advanced to 60 due to the shortage of labor) , except for
those appointed to the board of directors who are not
expected to retire at any age. However, the act of
"retiring" is normally a token event characterized by a
change in status from "permanent" to "temporary." With this
change in status, the worker traditionally receives a
Drucker, What We Can Learn From Japanese Manage-
ment," pp. 113-114.
2Margaret K. Chandler, "Management Rights: Made in
Japan," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 1, No. 1
Winter 1966, p. 132.
3
"A Shortage of Workers Changes Japan," Business
Week, January 31, 1970, p. 71.
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severance bonus equal to approximately two years pay and a
new wage equal to two thirds of his former remuneration. He
can now be laid off if there is a reduction in work.
However, the Japanese accept this possibility, as by the
time an employee reverts to a "temporary" worker he
normally has neither children nor parents to support. This
reduction in family responsibilities coupled with the
security of his severance bonus and personal savings gives
the worker the ability to weather a reasonable period of un-
employment without welfare. Unemployment benefits
averaging 67 percent of the former wage lasts up to 270
days for those who have been insured for ten years and up to
300 days for those who have been covered for more than 20
years. This variance is due to the fact that middle aged
or elderly job hunters find employment in a new job
2
comparatively difficult.
Japanese management assumes a responsibility of
considerable magnitude by providing "lifetime employment"
to all personnel they recruit. Occasionally, errors are
made in the employment selection process of both worker
(Koin ) and management ( Shokuin ) groups. In the case of the
Koin who does not adapt to the work situation, he is not
Drucker , "What We Can Learn From Japanese Manage-
ment," p. 114.
2
"Current Information," International Labor Review
,
Vol. 102, No. 5, November 1970, pp. 509-510.
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fired but shifted to a routine and harmless position.
Management handles the incompetent or inadequate Shokuin
in an ingenious manner by devising a number of elaborate
positions and titles for such individuals. Abegglen states:
. . . a man who enters the company from college
can not be demoted or fired. It is necessary to
find a niche for a man of insufficient capacity
where he can perform minor functions without too
greatly harming the over-all effectiveness of the
plant without damaging the prestige of the
individual.
1
This system of "lifetime" employment permits Japanese
companies to lay off a larger portion of their work force
2than most Western companies are likely or able to do. The
flexibility afforded by this ingenious approach meets
management needs for a flexible labor force and protects
3the income of those who need incomes the most. The burden
of adjustment is shouldered by those who can afford to be
laid off and have alternative sources of income. This
approach provides the worker with economic and job security
which engenders a psychological security. This benefits
management with a highly productive work force free from
- 4fear.
Abegglen, The Japanese Factory
,
p. 87.








In Japan people are hired first, and then positions
are provided for them. Workers employed by a larger firm
are afforded the opportunity to develop themselves through
job and/or geographical rotation. The underlying reason is
to gain broad experience and knowledge of the company's
overall operation. By changing jobs the company identifies
the most suitable job for the person and the one for which
he would be most effective for the company.
Increased performance is the goal of all Japanese
training programs. Employees at all levels are expected to
keep on training as part of their regular jobs. The
psychological conviction of job and income security help
bring about a cheerful willingness to accept and implement
newly learned changes in technology and work processes.
Employees generally regard increasing productivity as good
2for all. The Japanese see nothing miraculous about every-
one working hard to improve production. Remarks by a worker
at the Jokohama Shipyard of Ishikanajima-Harima Heavy
Industries (IHI) , Japan's largest shipbuilder, are considered
typical:
We are not hostile towards management. Managers
are employees, too. We're not selling our labor to
Morita, "Tradition Adapts to a Competitive Labor
Market," p. 53.
2
"Management and Labor: 'Same Team,'" U.S. News and
World Report , 4 October 1971, p. 56.
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them. We're all on the same team and must cooperate
for the good of our company."
Eighty percent of the 300-odd suggestions generated by
workers each month at IHI are adopted.
Japanese training is performance-focused. The
employee is trained for all the jobs at his job level. To
illustrate:
The man working as an electrician will auto-
matically attend training sessions in every single
area in the plant. And so will the man who pushes
a broom. Both of them may stay in their respective
jobs until they die or retire. Their pay is
independent, in large measure, of the job they are
doing, and is geared primarily to the length of
service, so that the highly skilled electrician may
well get far less money than the floor sweeper. But
both are expected to be reasonably proficient in
every job in the plant that is, generally speaking,
at the same level as their own job.
A professional worker is expected to be trained or to
train himself in every professional job needed in his
company. Correspondence courses, seminars, or continuation
courses available in all industrial-urban centers are the
vehicle to increased learning in such areas as accounting,
personnel, training and purchasing. There are exceptions to
this norm but only in such highly skilled vocations as
paper making and department store buying. However, even
those exempted from "continuous training" are expected to
perfect themselves in their own specialty after equivalent
1 Ibid .




training in the United States would have ended. The
practice of continuous training based on systematic schooling
rather than on craft skill and apprenticeship is possible
2because the worker has a "lifetime" job. This gives manage-
ment a versatile work force unencumbered with extreme
specialization and departmentalization.
Traditionally, industrial work-training groups meet
two or three times a week, sometimes on their own time, to
learn how to do their jobs better. Workers take pride in
3improvements that they have initiated. At each meeting
there is a "trainer" but the burden of training is on the
participants. This creates a feeling of worker involvement,
and resistance to new techniques or machines introduced
during worker training sessions is minimal. These small
groups often set goals for themselves in production and cost
cutting.
Japanese management's loyalty to the work force is
exemplified by the fact that not one employee lost his job
when Yawata and Fuji Iron and Steel Companies merged to form
4Nippon Steel in March of 1970.
1 Ibid .
2Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 304.
3
"Management and Labor: 'Same Team,'" p. 56.
4
"The- Giant Merger That Hurt Nobody," International
Management
,
April 1971, p. 32.
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An example of recent cost cutting endeavors by
workers at the Tokai Mill of Nippon Steel, the world's
largest steelmaker, illustrates the effectiveness of labor
management teamwork:
This year Japanese steelmakers cut production
more than 15 per cent when exports softened. It
became essential to cut costs. Management at
Tokai, accepting that wages and raw-material costs
could not be lowered, concentrated on such things
as raising ingot yields and decreasing the coking
ratio. Goal for the first half of 1971: a $4.17
reduction in the cost of making a ton of steel.
The target was met by joint labor-management
efforts . -E [Emphasis supplied. ]
Machine for machine, the Japanese can produce more
steel faster and at less cost than any other country in the
2
world. By virtue of continuous training, the Japanese
learning curve breaks above the plateau which United States
industrial engineers consider permanent. This has
contributed to the Japanese position of leading the major
3industrialized nations in increases in productivity.
Management Development
A large majority of aspiring executives enter a
company directly from the university system, and large firms
traditionally seek graduates of high prestige
"Management and Labor: 'Same Team,'" p. 56.
2








universities. Competitive entrance examinations are used by
all universities which gives all high school graduates an
equal opportunity and broadens the recruiting base for
management. Graduates in law, commerce, economics,
political science, and business administration are lumped
together as a group from which nontechnical management
trainees can be drawn.
Company entrance exams are another selection tool
which 'is preceded by an elaborate employment questionnaire
which reveals the applicant's experience, academic record,
family background, and the names of those whom they know in
3
the company who are willing to sponsor them. Tokyo
University, a government school, is widely recognized as
the most prestigious. The following tabulation illustrates
this point.
ALMA MATER OF PROMINENT BUSINESS LEADERS
University Percentage
Tokyo 40.6
Hito & Subashi 9.8
Keio 6.0
Abegglen, The Japanese Factory
, p. 33.
2 Shin-Ichi Takezawa, "Socio-Cultural Aspects of
Management in Japan: Historical Development and New
Challenges," International Labor Review
,
Vol. 94, No. 2,
August 1966, p. 154.
3Ross A. Webber, Culture and Management (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1969)
, p. 433.
















Another source which has evolved- since World War II
is the government agencies and bureaus where talented
bureaucrats have been induced to leave their civil service
tasks for positions of increased responsibility in private
industry. This practice has become accepted to the extent
that many Tokyo graduates now enter government administra-
tion fully expecting to later go into business.
Employers weigh heavily academic records with the
prestige of the employee's alma mater in deciding his
2position and his salary. Japan suffers from an acute
shortage of managerial talents because of the unprecedented
expansion of the business sector. Some Japanese firms are
3growing as rapidly as 10-30 percent a year. Whereas the
firm is traditionally concerned with the prestige of the
applicant's alma mater, the typical applicant, in selecting





2Morita, Tradition Adapts to a Competitive Labor
Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 68.
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which have equal importance: (1) the company's future
prospects; (2) the president's salary; (3) salary; and (4)
contents of work.
A recent survey of Japanese executives indicates that
more than 90 percent are graduates of universities and that
2three percent have been educated in a foreign country.
Among top management, approximately 80 percent have traveled
abroad more than three times, and 40 percent have been on
3
overseas assignments for more than three years. This
exposure to Western business methods has left a pronounced
mark in the technological arena. However, attempts to
introduce scientific management, piecework systems, human
relations, and other theories and practices, have been met
4
with reservation. Japanese business leaders have been
"highly selective, if not half-hearted" in initiating
Western management techniques. The study of management in
Western nations is not considered unimportant, but its
impact on Japanese managers is far more pronounced in
5technical subjects rather than nontechnical.
Most major firms maintain well-defined training
Imai , "Shukko, Jomukai, Ringi—The Ingredients of




p. 21. Ibid. , p. 23.
4Abegglen, The Japanese Factory
, p. 117.
Takezawa, "Socio-Cultural Aspects of Management in
Japan," p. 16 4.
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programs for various echelons of management, and management
associations offer short training courses which are
considered a part of the "continuous training" philosophy.
One unique course made possible through government and
business cooperation is designed to give managers a better
understanding of corporate hierarchial principles and team
spirit. Since 1955, private enterprises have utilized the
services of the Japanese military to develop managers and
executive recruits. At present, 100,000 civilian employees
undergo military training annually at Self Defense Force
Installations throughout Japan.
Most top managers believe that on-the-job training
2is the best vehicle for executive development. This is
illustrated by a survey of top Japanese managers in which
66 percent agreed with the statement: "The only way to
develop competent managers is to let them obtain plenty of
3
experience in actual business situations." Hence, the
development of management skills is intrinsically related to
the company where it is developed and refined. This makes
it more difficult for an executive to transfer his skill
from one organization to another. This lack of universality
"Changing Employees Into Men Of Action," Inter-
national Management
,
July 1971, pp. 38-39.
2Takezawa, "Socio-Cultural Aspects of Management in
Japan," p. 155.
3Keizi Doyu Kai, Management Ideology and Business
Activity (Tokyo, 1964), p. 77.
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of managerial skill complements the practice of "lifelong
employment" where changing companies is identified with
personal failure. This prejudice against worker mobility is
pervasive and strong. However, the present shortage of
labor has contributed in a large measure to a recent shift
in attitudes of employees regarding the stigma attached to
changing jobs. This trend in employee and employer
attitudes has been noted during the past two years in the
personal services industries viz. finance, large consumer
2
retail merchandizers , and international trading.
Top management in Japan recognizes the importance of
managerial development and discharges this task through an
informal network of senior middle-management people who act
as "godfathers" to the young men during the first ten years
3
of their careers in the company. This unique management
development system hinges around members of the upper-middle
management group who have been passed over at age 45 for the
top management positions and who are destined for, at the
most, one more promotion before mandatory retirement at age
Yoshi Tsorumi, "Myths That Mislead U.S. Managers
in Japan," Harvard Business Review , July-August, 1971,
p. 120.
2Katsuhiro Fujiwara, Private interview conducted
with the Chief Economist, United States-Japan Trade Council,
Washington, D.C., February 1972.




55. These middle level managers, chosen to be "godfathers,"
are free from pressures of internal politics and factionalism.
Young executives and "godfathers" are traditionally graduates
2
of the same university. The "godfather" learns to know his
"godchildren" and is available for advice and counsel. He
serves as a guide and perhaps example to his proteges.
Personnel officers seek out the opinion of the "godfather
"
before making assignments which involve promotion or
transfers. The "godfather" is able to effectively counsel
his junior managers unlike the first-line supervisor in
American business. The latter frequently is reticent to
discuss transfers of topnotch management trainees, although
such action would have a net benefit to the firm. The
"godfather" system is effective because it assures that
some respected and successful member of management shows a
special concern for the young managers and professional
people. It enables the senior and junior executives to
communicate even within the formal hierarchy of Japanese
3
organizations.
The rank-and-file worker is o::ten permitted to
remain with the company past 55 as a temporary worker.
However, managers can at the most hope to be transferred to
a subsidiary firm.
2Peter F. Drucker , Men, Ideas and Politics (New
York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 229.





Most decisions in Japan are made by the top
executives and the role of the middle manager in the decision
making process is not clearly definable. Over the years a
defensive mechanism has been developed by these middle
managers called Ringi . Literally translated, it means
"decision making in writing in concert with superiors."
Risso and Ringi are used interchangeably to denote
this Japanese process of "group-centered decision making."
The initiating idea can come from anyone and often originates
at the lower levels of management to be discussed endlessly
at all levels of the management hierarchy. A thorough
discussion of the issues by all who are effected evolves into
a process of communication, accommodation, and education.
The Japanese regard defining the question as the important
element in decision making (American management concentrates
on finding an answer) . Emphasis is placed on: (1) deciding
whether there is a need for a decision; and (2) what the
2decision is all about, not what the decision should be.
The mechanics of the process are succinctly described
by Howard F. Van Zandt:
Well over 90% of all large Japanese companies, and
many small ones, follow a decision-making system
Imai, "Shukko, Jomuaki, Ringi--The Ingredients of
Executive Selection in Japan," p. 25.




known as ringi . Government agencies also follow it.
The system is based on the principle that decisions
will be made by groups, in accordance with a free
consensus. Usually it is formalized by a sort of
buck slip, or ringisho
,
which carries pertinent
facts and a recommendation prepared by someone at
the middle-management level. The proposal is
passed upward and horizontally to all who are
concerned. Each man who sees the ringisho is
expected to study the proposal and affix his seal
to it. Ultimately it reaches the president of the
company, and when his vermilion seal' is stamped,
the policy is officially adopted. The fact that
many men
—
perhaps 20 or more—will have sealed the
proposal has the effect of taking the responsibility
away from any one individual.
If a person's reaction to a proposal is nega-
tive, his best chance to stop— or change it will
come in the many conferences that may be called
to consider the proposal. However, once a consensus
has been reached in conference, it is awkward to
block the decision, for a unilateral disapproval
offends the Japanese group spirit. Some men,
however, do so by pigeonholing the ringisho .
Others show their objection by affixing their
seals upside down. In some organizations, a man
may pass the buck by stamping his seal sideways,
which, by custom, means that he has seen the
proposal but not passed judgment on it.l
The ramifications of this "group decision" system affect the
efficiency and morale of the entire organization. It allows
men who are responsible for a matter to propose a plan which
calls for a favorable decision. Furthermore, higher
executives are relieved from checking details from trusted
subordinates. This is tantamount to informal delegation of
2
authority. Although the process of accommodation takes
considerable time, once the final "stamp of approval" has
van Zandt, "How to Negotiate in Japan," pp. 47-48.
2Yamada, "Japanese Management Practices," pp. 22-23.
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been made, the entire organization is prepared to implement
the decision. The system insures that all elements concerned
with the matter have completed their staff work and have
coordinated with others before forwarding the Ringisho to the
president for final approval. In this regard the top
executive is somewhat restricted regarding final action. He
is traditionally bound to either accept or reject the
proposal. Modification of the proposal would be considered
by those below the highest member in the hierarchy as a lack
2
of trust or confidence in their ability.
Hence, the Japanese are prepared to implement the
decision very quickly once an issue is resolved. Little
3time is required to "sell" a decision. The total time
required to transmit thought (either innovative or
implemental) into action is about the same in American and
Japanese firms. However, there are major differences in the
overall result which Herman Kahn has graphically distilled:
. . . in a Japanese firm the debate is carried on
in such a way as to increase morale and the general
sense of participation, while in the American firm
the debate that takes place after the decision has
been made is--almost by definition—subversive , or
Robert J. Ballon, The Japanese Employee (Tokyo:
Sophia University, 1969), p. 90.
2 Stephen P. Dawkms , Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Far East and Asian Affairs,
Japan Desk. Private Interview conducted in Washington,
D.C., February 1972.




at least against official policy. It therefore is
more likely to hurt morale and the sense of
participation. In the Japanese system, since the
debate is aboveboard and understood as necessary,
everybody contributes wholeheartedly to facilita-
ting it and conducting it as efficiently as is
reasonably compatible with the objectives and
customs. In the case of the American debate,
since it is underground and subversive, it is ,
difficult to facilitate or organize efficiently.
The Ringi process is focused on understanding the
problem. By virtue of the total effort required to reach a
decision, management is involved in making big decisions on
truly important matters affecting policy. Small decisions
frequently go unmade formally, but are left to informal
processes for resolution. By contrast, American managers
find themselves spending an inordinate amount of time and
energy with decisions that do not really matter. In this
connection Drucker makes the point:
Anyone who knows Western business, government
agencies, or educational institutions, knows that
their managers make far too many small decisions
as a rule. And nothing, I have learned, causes as
much trouble in an organization as a lot of small
decisions. Whether the decision concerns moving
the water cooler from one end of the hall to the
other or phasing out of one's oldest business
makes little emotional difference. One decision
takes as much time and generates as much heat as
the other!
2
For some years American psychologists have pleaded for
greater understanding of the effect "participative management"
ment," p. 111.
Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate
, p. 44.
2Drucker, "What We Can Learn From Japanese Manage-
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can have on a firm. The overall lack of understanding on
the part of Americans in application of this management
technique explains in large measure why so many "long-range
plans" and "strategies" never get beyond the planning stage.
United States executives frequently attempt to implement
plans by exhortation and pressure. In contrast, the
Japanese system for making decisions incorporates features
of "participative management" which affords managers at all




The paternalistic nature of Japanese firms is a
product of the nation's social context and has an overriding
effect on labor-management relations. The Japanese labor
movement was born just prior to the close of the Nineteenth
Century and was immediately the target of legislative and
administrative suppression. In 1940, under pressure from
the powerful Zaibatsus , the government forced all unions to
combine in a single organization (SAMPO) that included all
employers and employees from each firm in Japan. The
professed goal was a marshaling of worker spirit and
2
national production to win the war. The labor movement was
Keith Davis, Human Relations in Business (New York;
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1954), p. 170.
2Masu-Ichi Honda, "Managing Personnel in Japanese
Industry," Personnel Journal
, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 191-192.
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emancipated from the harness of militarism in 19 45, and its
future was assured by the New Japanese Constitution. Article
2 8 of this instrument guarantees the right to organize and
bargain collectively and applies to workers employed by
public corporations as well as civil servants of government
at all levels. However, the constitutional guarantee of the
basic right to collective bargaining is subject to
restrictions necessary to guarantee the interests of the
people' as a whole.
Under the protection of the 1952 Constitution, the
trade union movement in Japan has flourished and presently
enjoys a membership of 11.2 million workers (35.2 percent of
the nonagricultural labor force) who belong to about 48,000
unions. One seventh of the Japanese work force falls under
a special labor relations law. This group consists of the
public employees who number about three million (27 percent
of Japan's organized labor). They have the right to bargain
collectively but do not have the right to strike, although
brief work stoppages and go-slow tactics are frequently
utilized to show worker solidarity. Wage adjustments for
employees of public corporations and civil servants are
traditionally settled by arbitration on the part of the
National Personnel Authority (NPA) or the National
Enterprise and Public Corporation Labor Relations Commission
"Current Information," International Labor Review
,
Vol. 95, No. 3, March 1967, pp. 239-240.
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(NEPCLRC) . The government acts on recommendations from these
arbitrators and has the final authority to implement wage
adjustments. Since 1957 the government has implemented the
Commission awards in full. The union organization and
practices by government employees parallels that of many
countries
.
The significant and truly unique aspect of the trade
union movement in Japan is found in the enterprise union.
The effect of these unions has been significant when one
considers that the practices of lifelong employment,
systematic promotion and wages commensurate with social and
living needs have become institutionalized only since World
2War II with the backing of organized labor.
The overall effect of national employment practices
—
deferred wage payments, semiannual bonuses and retirement
allowances, diversified fringe benefits and service programs
which frequently include company subsidized cafeterias and
housing facilities--have given the union workers a sense of
3
appreciation for the paternalistic stance of their employer.
The membership of the trade unions includes all the
employees of an enterprise but does not extend beyond it.
Shirai, "Prices and Wages in Japan: Towards an
Anti-Inflationary Policy," pp. 235-236.
2Ballon, "Understanding the Japanese," p. 26.




Thus, it appears that Japanese management has devised an
organization identical to the "company union," a device once
frequently used by management of textile, steel, mining, and
other industries in the United States, to counter attempts
to organize workers by industrial and craft unions. A
thorough study of the labor management practices reveals
that this is not the case. The issue is made clear by Koji
Taira:
The congruence of the union membership with the
muster-roll of the employees of the firm often
raises a suspicion that such a union may be
nothing but a "company union". While one cannot
deny that what the Japanese enterprise union can
win for its membership is (as with other unions)
broadly limited by the firm's ability to pay, it
is well known for its independence from management
in pursuing what is good for the workers. Japanese
trade unions have succeeded in securing a
respectable place for workers at the enterprise
level. Japanese employers have come to accept
their employees as substantive partners
.
A distinguishing feature of the enterprise union is
2that it lives and dies with the firm in which it is formed.
The labor movement has established a position within
individual enterprises, and their role relevant to the labor
market may be summarized as follows:
(1) Trade unions are organized on a plant-
wide or enterprise basis and as a rule are
composed of all employees up to the chief of
Koji Taira, "Participation by VJorkers' and Employers'
Organizations in Economic Planning in Japan," International
Labor Review, Vol. 94, No. 6, December 1966, pp. 530-531.
193.
2 Konda, "Managing Personnel in Japanese Industry,"
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section level with permanent status.
(2) Organized labor is concentrated in
firms which employ more than 500 workers. (See
Table 6.)
(3) The national industrial unions are
basically loose federations of enterprise unions
with restricted power over their affiliates.
The enterprise union has untrammelled authority in
the collective bargaining process.
1
(4) Employment regulations (which include
work rules and collective labor agreements) and
welfare programs are considered to be a specific
responsibility of management which falls outside
the purvuew of union concern. Rather, the
unions concentrate on protecting the lifelong
employment and securing annual wage increases
through the traditional spring wage„push called
Shunto-Soba or "spring-fight rate."
The expressed desire of the Shunto leaders is to
develop a wider labor solidarity in the form of industry-
wide unionism. However, the offensive in fact perpetuates
enterprise unionism. By offering the maximum concession
proposed by the NIKKEIREN (Japan Federation of Employers'
Association)
,
plus some accouterments of its own, management
fosters the enterprise consciousness of the employees and
thus reduces labor problems. Juxtaposed with the unified
wage demands of the Shunto leaders, minus some amount
conceded by the enterprise union, the union fosters
conformity with the company as well as the union. At the
conclusion of union-employer negotiations, each side strikes
Shirai, "Prices and Wages in Japan: Towards an
Anti-Inflationary Policy," p. 234.




PERCENT OF ESTIMATED RATE OF ORGANIZATION
BY SIZE OF ENTERPRISE, 19691
Size of Enterprise
All enterprises
500 or more employees
100-499 employees . .
.
30-99 employees
29 or fewer employees














a definite balance of face-saving.
The effect of the Shunto has been dramatic. Between
1967 and 1970 spring rate increases exceeded 42 percent. The
success of the unions in obtaining these inflationary wage
increases can be attributed to the recent labor shortage
(three job openings for every job seeker) and an annual
increase in worker productivity that in many industries
2
matches the wage hikes.
More than seven million of the union members are
organized in three major union federations.
Sohyo (General Council of trade unions of Japan)
with its 4.25 million members is by far the most militant
union, endorsing Marxist concepts of class warfare and
advocating nationwide strikes. It is the major supporter of
the Japan Socialist Party and takes positions on inter-
national issues which parallel the Socialist Party. Two
thirds of its members are public service workers including
civil servants, postal workers, and teachers.
Domei (Japan Confederation of Labor) is the second
largest with 1.7 million members and consists almost entirely
of unions in the private enterprise sector. It was formed in
19 6 4 by the merging of the Zenro and Sodomei labor federa-
tions and has served as the principal supporter of the
Ballon, "The Japanese Employee," pp. 236-237.
2
"Japanese Head For a Bout With Inflation," p. 101.
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Moderate Democratic Socialist Party.
Churitsu Roren (Federation of Independent Unions)
is a loose amalgam of 1.0 million industrial workers drawn
mostly from the electrical, manufacturing, and construction
industries.
The three major labor federations look upon the
Shunto as a device to overcome the intrinsic weakness of
enterprise unionism. The spring wage offensive is now 16
years -old and has become an institution for wage-fixing. At
present more than two-thirds of the organized workers take
part in this collective effort to extend the level of
increases achieved in firms and industries with high
productivity to those with lower productivity. This
collective bargaining has been effective in causing the
work force to receive annual wage increases which in some
2
sectors have not been offset by productivity. (See Table
7.)
During the past three years the country has
experienced a conspicuous rise in the prices of goods and
services in the lower-productivity sectors viz-a-viz the
small and medium scale industries and mining. (See Table
8.) The industries with high productivity have in general
The U.S. Department of State Fact Book of the
Countries of the World (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1969), pp. 358-359.
2 Sharai, "Prices and Wages in Japan: Towards an



















1960 8.0 4.2 13.1 1.0 3.6
1961 11.5 5.9 10.2 1.0 5.3
1962 9.4 2.5 2.7 -1.6 6.8
1963 10.3 2.6 9.8 1.7 7.6
1964 10.6 6.5 12.1 0.2 3.8
1965 8.7 1.0 3.5 0.8 7.6
1966 11.6 6.2 13.0 2.4 5.1
1967 13.5 9.1 16.5 1.9 4.0
1968 15.7 9.9 14.3 0.8 5.3
1969 17.2 11.4 15.0 2.2 5.2
"Rate of change" is the rate of increase or decrease
by index points (1965 = 100) over the previous year.
Source : Wages—Ministry of Labor; labor productivity—Japan
Productivity Center; wholesale prices—Bank of
Japan; consumer prices—Bureau of Statistics,




PERCENTAGE RATES OF CHANGE IN WHOLESALE
PRICES, 1956-1969
Average annual rate of
increase or decrease
Type of Product and Source 1956-60 1960-64 1964-69
All products -0.9 0.4 1.8
Industrial products -1.6 -0.2 1.3
Large firms „.. -2.7 -1.0 0.5
Medium and small firms . 0.9 1.7 3.1
Non-industrial products ... 0.6 2.3 4.1
Agriculture and fishery . 1.9 3.0 5.5
Mining -2.1 0.3 2.2
Other -1.9 2.0 1.7
Capitalized at 50 million yen and over.
2Capitalized at less than 50 million yen.
Source ; Bank of Japan.
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maintained their price levels (a modest 0.5 percent annual
increase from 1964 to 1969).
It seems unlikely that the labor movement will cease
its annual demand for wage increases even though they
contribute to inflation and may lead to a possible loss of
competitive wage advantage now enjoyed by many Japanese
industries in world markets.
.
(See Chart 4.)
Although the labor movement has succeeded in in-
creasing the wages of the country's work force (see Chart
5) , their collective strength is debilitated by paternalistic
employment practices and rivalry between the politically
affiliated labor federations. Union practices in general are
weakened by organization along company lines.
The postwar climate of labor management relations has
been one characterized by peace. There have not been any
major strikes in years. The unions tend to associate their
long range interests with that of the company. The real
increases in wages achieved by labor in Japan have, by in
large, been attributable to increases in productivity.
The previous discussion has covered a number of
important aspects of Japan's economic institutions which
have a direct bearing on Japanese managerial concepts and
practices. These factors determine the decision environment
for management. The implications of these concepts and
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ANALYTICAL COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
MANAGERIAL CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES
Introduction
In order to analyze and contrast the concepts and
practices of management in the United States and Japan
discussed above, a descriptive modeling technique was
developed which illustrates the inter-cultural variances
among selected parameters of managerial practices. Three
analytical tables were developed to present dimensional
comparisons of behavioral, functional and institutional
aspects of the contemporary management practices. This
analytical approach was developed from concepts which are
presented subjectively in Chapters II and III of this study.
It is intended that such a portrayal might prove to be a
useful device for facilitating analysis of variance in
contemporary management practices between the two cultures.
The inter-cultural managerial practices model thus
devised presents various parameters of managerial practice
within a comparative cultural context and according to















Three tabular matrices are used to display the
dimensions of comparison depicting the variances of manage-
rial practice attributable to the differences in the
cultural environments of the two countries. When such
technique is applied, it becomes apparent that external
factors such as educational, sociological, legal-political
and economic institutions have far-reaching impacts on
managerial practices utilized within the two cultures.
The model expresses the cultural comparisons
developed from an extensive survey of the available
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literature. This matrix attempts to give a comparative
survey of this material. Terms of parameters used to
elucidate managerial practices within the cultural context
are derived from the literature. It is felt that this
means of comparison provides a basis for highlighting
commonality as well as differences between managerial
concepts and practices in the two cultures. This distilla-
tion of the thoughts of many observers of managerial
practices in the United States and Japan is by no means
exhaustive; however, it is considered to be representative
of major trends in the two cultures.
A survey of literature on managerial practices in
the United States and Japan is used to compare and contrast
the managerial parameters. The literary source for each
cultural comparison is indicated by a source number which
provides the reader with a means of cross reference between
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It is always difficult to cross over widely divergent
cultural practices and objectively view variants in manage-
ment style. This is especially true when the country, as
in the' case of Japan, has a singular history and culture.
The evolution of managerial practices in Japan can be
described as one which has blended the scientific management
of the United States with the traditional cultural factors
such as filiality which continue to be pervasive within the
Japanese society. Due to this commonality of scientific
management, Japan may be analyzed using a United States
perception which makes this type of study valid.
Before World War II the scientific management
concept developed in the United States had permeated many of
Japan's industries and the country was recognized as the
only Asian country with advanced industry and technology.
The period of occupation after the war brought about an
increased assimilation of Western industrial practices.
The economic development of Japan post World War II
represents an expression of a unique blending of traditional




influences brought in during the occupation. This agglomera-
tion of practices gave new value to the traditional
practices which have become uniquely suited to advanced
industrial activity.
Some of the unique practices which can be qualita-
tively described have contributed to the unparalleled growth
of that nation's economy. The recent impact of Japan's
industry on world markets has been significant. The
sustained increase in productivity has caused managers from
other nations to look introspectively at their own
managerial practices and contrast their performance to that
of the Japanese. In making such an evaluation it is
important to consider the institutional environment as well
as the behavioral and functional settings of the two
cultures.
The three most critical factors which have contri-
buted to the differences in managerial practice in the United
States and Japan are reviewed briefly.
The Business-Government Partnership
" Japanese management receives an unquantifiable
support from a government oriented towards cooperation
rather than confrontation with business institutions. This
spirit of cooperation is manifested through special tax
advantages and financial support for firms in selected
industries which the government and business jointly deem to
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merit in that it has enabled Japanese management to build
effective, energetic and cohesive work force units which
have collectively contributed to the economic growth of that
nation. Workers in Japan enjoy a "psychological contract"
with management which contributes to a strong feeling of
security stemming from the knowledge that their employment
for life will provide for income according to age and social
responsibility. The Japanese worker knows intuitively that
once he has achieved a permanent status, the firm will
undertake the responsibility of providing an income even
when there is insufficient work to maintain all permanent
workers engaged in productive pursuits. This commitment is
also applicable to the management of the firm in that when
staff managerial personnel are employed upon graduation
from the university, they are normally assured gainful
employment for a minimum of twenty-five years. This system
has caused employees and employers to think of themselves
as members of the same team who through joint efforts can
achieve maximum benefits for the firm and the individual.
As a result the Japanese worker is imbued with a profound
sense of loyalty to his employer which contributes to high
worker motivation and productivity.
The Employee-Management Relationship
The tendency of the Japanese worker to identify
closely with his organization or firm has a far-reaching
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impact on morale and the status of unions in Japan. While
the work force has about the same proportion of organized
workers in Japan as is the case in the United States,
there exists a major variation in the relationship between
management and labor in that all collective bargaining is
conducted at the enterprise level rather than by individual
craft and skilled groups. The dual loyalty between workers
and the firm negates the need for a strong allegiance to a
third party in the work place. This results in the tendency
for unions to associate long range worker interests with that
of the firm. This close association of workers and manage-
ment has led to the involvement of management in many
matters considered to be extraneous to the organization and
avoided by management in the United States. Abegglen has
observed:
Problems of family finances, living standards and
[family] education give an indication of the range
of involvement of the company in the life of the
worker. What is most interesting about these
situations is that company action is not taken
reluctantly or accepted grudgingly. Both manage-
ment and workers assume it is the company's
responsibility to involve itself in such matters
and the worker's privilege and, duty to receive
such assistance and attention.
It is apparent that this type of management involvement in
the welfare of the worker, together with the spirit of
loyalty of the worker to the firm, has resulted in a
national labor-management relationship which has been





characterized by peace and harmony and has been free from
strikes in major industries for many years.
The Inter-Cultural Managerial Practices Model
provides considerable introspection to the practice of
management in Japan. The matrix approach has been useful
in comparing and contrasting the practice of management in
the selected countries. Valuable insights may be drawn by
using the United States' conception of the managerial
function process. The model is valid and useful. It
furnishes a unique approach to systematically measure
cultural variance.
The managerial practices in Japan are a variant of
United States management, yet there are significant and
unique differences. Based upon the analytical techniques
developed during the course of this study it may be
concluded that the concepts and practices are influenced by
the external environment and culture.
While opinions differ, it seems clear from this
study that there are pressures developing within the
Japanese society which will bring about a change in work force
values. Additional research on the impact of these changes
in employment practices would be timely and appropriate.
Ultimately Japan's economic future depends upon how
well the traditional values and principles of scientific
management are blended together into a posture which
accommodates the inevitable dynamic of change. The unique
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experience following World War II may not provide a model for
the long term future in that traditional values may not
continue to be relevant in an advanced or post-industrial
social setting-
While this study delineates many points of contrast
between Western culture and the unique culture of Japan
which effect managerial practices and performance, the
implications are clear that Japan must determine the
relative social trade-off between the social costs of
maintaining traditional values and structures and the
benefits of continuing the impressive rate of economic
growth characteristic of the postwar period. Implicit in
this choice is a movement towards convergence with Western
social values and managerial practices characteristic of
the prototype industrial society of the United States or
the development of an independent managerial methodology
as the industrial system of Japan matures. This study
reveals numerous tendencies towards convergence in the
managerial styles of Japan and the United States. The
study suggests that the rapidity of convergence will
ultimately depend upon the maturation of the Japanese
industrial system and that ultimately the two systems will
tend to converge once the level of economic development
becomes generally comparable.
It should be noted, however, that it is impossible
to divorce cultural bias from a study of this nature. Since
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the traditional structure of management theory is based
primarily on Western concepts it is simpler to gauge
apparent impact of the United States system of scientific
management on Japan than to assess the reverse impacts of the
Japanese synthesis on United States management concepts and
practices. It is, therefore, obvious that the convergence
discussed above will at least. in part be influenced by
Japanese influences operating on United States managerial
practices. The final outcome of these mutual influences
will be more clearly seen once economic growth produces a
general managerial environment in Japan similar to that
experienced in the United States and the reverse impacts
will be determined by the degree of success that Japan
achieves in commercial competition with the United States
and other economies.
Perhaps the greatest opportunity to gain the
advantages of both systems of managerial practice lies in
thoughtful and rigorous examination of the mutuality of
influences that the two unique and flourishing cultures
exert on one another. Students and practitioners of
management should be aware of the blending of concepts
and social values in order to proact and compete
successfully with the Japanese in world markets.
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Conclave of key members of board of directors.
Japanese ideographic script.
Current Japanese syllabary.
An alignment of firms based on common interests
sponsored by one bank.
Worker hired by firm upon leaving school.
Small firm sponsored by larger firm.
Wage worker.
Merit of years.
Japanese practice of management
Grouping of satellite firms around large
firm.







RINGI Japanese process of decision making.
RINGISHO Buckslip used by Ringi process.
SHOKU-BA Place of work.
SHOKUIN Person in charge management level.
SHUGYO KISOKU Employment regulations.
SHUKKO System of transferring worker to subsidiary
firm.
SHUNTO Annual push for wage increase.
SHUSHIN KOYO Lifelong employment
SOOGOO SHOOSH General trading company
ZIABATSU Huge politically and economically powerful
combines usually family dominated and
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